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We review the implications of the 2007 Farm Bill for the risk management dimensions of
U.S. agriculture and policy. Legislative proposals suggest significant changes in risk
management policy, including the introduction of state or national revenue insurance. We
also pursue an empirical analysis of the interrelationships of crop insurance, disaster relief,
and farm profitability. We find an inverse relationship between disaster assistance and
insurance purchases. Our analysis also suggests that farmers that buy insurance and that
receive disaster payments tend to have higher returns to farming.
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The 2007 calendar year drew to a close
without resolution on a new Farm Bill.
Competing versions of the new legislation
existed in the House and Senate. The House
version of the Farm Bill passed on July 27,
2007, by a relatively wide margin, with a vote
of 231–191. On December 14, 2007, a very
similar version passed in the Senate by a vote
of 79–14. Modest differences between the two
versions of the legislation are yet to be
resolved in conference. However, it is clear
that a generous package of support, scored at
about $285 billion over the next 10 years, will
be forthcoming.
Critics of U.S. farm programs have raised a
number of objections about the evolution of
policy (and the concomitant lack of perceived
progress toward reform) over the last 10 years.
The sheer magnitude of the financial support
($190 billion under the 2002 Farm Bill and the
aforementioned $285 billion estimated for the
proposed 2007 legislation) raises many ques-
tions regarding the intent of such support and
the possible implications for U.S. and inter-
national agricultural markets. One complaint
that is often raised about U.S. farm support
pertains to its significant concentration among
a relatively small number of producers. The
Environmental Working Group (EWG) re-
ports that, between 2003 and 2005, the top 1%
of U.S. farmers received 17% of all farm
subsidies while the top 10% received 66% of
subsidies. Within the top 1%, the average
annual payment was nearly $126,000.
1 Other
concerns involve the potential for various
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grams that are directly tied to support (‘‘cou-
pled’’ programs) encourage more production
by bringing more land into production.
Other programs, such as the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), serve to remove
environmentally sensitive land from produc-
tion by paying subsidies to farmers that agree
to place their land in reserve for a 10- or 15-
year period.
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples
of agricultural policies that may not be
entirely consistent with one another lies in
the role of subsidized risk management and
disaster relief. Throughout various legislative
actions since 1980, the U.S. Congress has
signaled its intentions that the primary instru-
ment for managing agricultural risks and
disasters should be through subsidized federal
crop insurance. In recent years, legislative
changes through the 1994 Federal Crop
Insurance Reform Act and the 2000 Agricul-
tural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) have
significantly expanded the depth, scope, and
range of U.S. crop insurance programs. The
1994 legislation made participation in the
federal crop insurance program a mandatory
requirement for eligibility for other farm
program benefits. This requirement proved
unpopular with producers and thus was
repealed after the 1995 crop year. Significant
premium subsidies have been used to encour-
age participation and by 2006, 55 million acres
were insured with a total liability of over
$67 billion.
2
Despite political rhetoric to the contrary,
the U.S. Congress has repeatedly used ad hoc
disaster payments as a means of addressing
yield and price shortfalls. Between 1975 and
1981, Commodity Credit Corporation outlays
for disaster assistance exceeded $3.57 billion.
3
Since 1985, the U.S. Congress has approved
nearly $30 billion in emergency agricultural
disaster aid to more than two million farm and
ranch operations (EWG). Payments were
made in every year since 1985 and, in 12 of
the 22 years of this period, disaster payments
exceeded $1 billion.
By its very nature, disaster relief is ad hoc,
meaning that it is typically not part of a larger,
multi-year package of farm programs but is
rather intended to address a specific immedi-
ate problem. Critics of ad hoc disaster relief
have argued that its continual provision,
especially in the Upper and Lower Great
Plains, results in a form of free insurance and
thus reduces incentives to participate in the
federal crop insurance program. Because of
the systemic nature of agricultural risks, ad
hoc disaster relief may skew participation in
the federal crop insurance program toward
higher-risk individuals. This is because
lower-risk farmers may only experience yield
losses when such losses are widespread, which
would be more likely to trigger ad hoc
payments.
Disaster relief and federal crop insurance
have played important roles in deliberations
over the 2007 Farm Bill. Both versions of the
Bill contain provisions to establish an optional
revenue insurance plan. In the Senate version,
a state-level revenue protection plan called the
‘‘Average Crop Revenue’’ program was in-
cluded in the Bill. On the House side, an
optional revenue-based, counter-cyclical pay-
ments program was included. This program
would operate at the national level and would
make payments when actual revenues for a
covered commodity fall beneath a national
target revenue, which is based on the 2007
Bill’s target prices. Both plans reinforce the
objective of eliminating ad hoc support in
favor of a standing disaster plan that would
make payments whenever prices and/or yield
shortfalls occurred.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate
the interrelationships between ad hoc disaster
assistance, participation in the federal crop
insurance program, and the overall realized
profitability of individual farm operations. To
this end, we consider a multivariate model of
insurance and disaster payment participation
and the realized return to agricultural produc-
tion. Our model is estimated using farm-level
2Statistics were taken from unpublished data
available from the Risk Management Agency of the
USDA.
3Statistics are based upon unpublished data
obtained from the USDA.
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plan of our paper is as follows. The next
section reviews the current status of the 2007
Farm Bill. Particular attention is given to
specific provisions affecting disaster assistance
and crop insurance. The third section presents
empirical estimates of the aforementioned
model of disaster assistance, crop insurance
participation, and farm profitability. The final
section briefly reviews the results and offers
concluding remarks.
Disaster Assistance, Crop Insurance, and
the 2007 Farm Bill
The overarching goal of our analysis is to
consider the interactive roles of disaster relief
and crop insurance in forming ‘‘safety nets’’
for farmers. Provision of ‘‘safety nets’’ has
become a mantra for policy makers over the
last 20 years. A relevant question—and an
issue underlying our analysis—is whether such
safety nets serve more of a wealth/income
enhancing role than providing emergency risk
management assistance. The perennial nature
of disaster payments and their regional
concentration suggests that some farmers’
production decisions may reflect expectations
about disaster payment receipts.
Disaster Assistance
In spite of much rhetoric to the contrary, U.S.
farm programs have shown little sign of
reform or ‘‘transition’’ to greater market
orientation with less government involvement.
Figure 1 illustrates net farmer income less
government payments and the proportion of
net farmer income represented by direct
government payments. The former variable
represents net income generated from the
market (rather than through government
payments) and the latter reflects the propor-
tion of net income generated by direct
government payments. The figure illustrates
several important points. First, when govern-
ment payments are excluded, real net farm
income has fallen substantially over the
postwar period and has experienced periods
of very substantial volatility.
A second important point is that govern-
ment involvement in U.S. agriculture has
strengthened over time. Temporary periods
of diminished government support are nota-
ble—especially in the years that surround the
1996 FAIR Act. Prior to the legislation,
markets were strong and thus government
involvement was modest. Such conditions are,
of course, conducive to policy reforms that
Figure 1. Net Farm Income Less Government Payments and the Ratio of Government
Payments to Net Farm Income
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transition to the market—as was the case with
the 1996 legislation. However, the decrease in
market-based returns and the concomitant
increase in government support that occurred
in the late 1990s illustrate the will and intent of
Congress to support U.S. agriculture. Ad hoc
market loss assistance payments exceeded
$23 billion between fiscal years 1999 and
2004. Finally, the counter-cyclical nature of
government support is obvious in the figure.
Larger government payments correspond to
periods of market declines. This occurs both
through ad hoc support and through standing
farm programs such as deficiency payments
and other coupled support.
The goal of our empirical analysis is to
consider the relationships among ad hoc
disaster payments, participation in the crop
insurance program, and the overall profitabil-
ity of farming. We begin with an examination
of the geographic patterns of the provision of
ad hoc disaster payments. Figure 2 presents
the geographic dispersion of ad hoc disaster
payments (2005 real terms) made through the
Farm Service Agency (FSA).
4 The figure
illustrates the fact that ad hoc disaster
assistance tends to be highly concentrated in
several specific regions. In particular, a
‘‘disaster payment belt’’ is apparent through-
out the upper, middle, and lower Great Plains.
Likewise, geographic concentrations of disas-
ter payments are apparent in California and in
the southeastern United States. In light of our
interest in the interactive roles of diaster
payments and crop insurance, we focus our
analysis on an area of the United States that
has realized such a geographic concentration
of payments—the Great Plains. In particular,
we concentrate on two of the Economic
Research Service’s farm resource regions—
the Prairie Gateway and the Northern Great
Plains.
5
Farm Bill Crop Insurance Issues
Federally subsidized crop insurance has been a
major component of the U.S. government’s
agricultural policy over the last three decades.
It is a key element of the income safety net
available to producers when they incur losses
due to natural disasters (i.e., from adverse
weather events, pests, diseases, and other
unavoidable causes prevalent in agriculture).
As such, crop insurance–related issues have
played a central role in the debates that
accompanied the development of the House
and Senate versions of the 2007 Farm Bill.
6
The following subsections discuss the major
crop insurance–related issues in both versions
of the bill. However, the discussion here is not
meant to be comprehensive of all the crop
insurance–related issues, but only serves to
highlight the issues that we think have more
far-reaching welfare consequences to the farm
economy.
Revenue-based commodity payments. In
both the House and Senate bills, a new
revenue-based commodity program is pro-
posed where producers can receive payments if
there are shortfalls in actual revenues per acre
relative to some ‘‘target’’ revenue. The House
and Senate versions of this program differ in
terms of the geographic scope used to measure
the actual and ‘‘target’’ revenues needed to
calculate the revenue payment. In the House
version, the geographic scope is at the national
level. That is, payments are triggered when the
actual national revenue per acre for the
commodity is less than the national target
revenue per acre (the latter being set by the
government prior to the crop year). On the
other hand, the Senate version calculates the
revenue payments at the state level—a pay-
ment is triggered when actual state revenue
falls below an average revenue guarantee. It is
important to note that this revenue program is
5The USDA’s farm resource regions are defined to
group counties according to production specialization.
4All financial variables in this analysis were
deflated using the aggregate consumer price index
and are expressed in 2005 dollar equivalent terms.
6At the time of this writing (Dec. 20, 2007), the
House and Senate has approved their respective
versions of the 2007 Farm Bill. The next step is for
the House-Senate farm bill conference committee to
meet and work out the differences in the House and
Senate versions of the proposed legislation.
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have been in place in the previous versions of
the farm bill (i.e., direct payments, price-based
counter-cyclical payments, marketing loan
assistance, etc.).
Even though the revenue-based commodity
program is not directly tied to the crop
insurance program (per se), we include a
discussion of this program because of its
potential interaction and/or interrelationship
with the crop insurance program participation
and program efficiency/cost-effectiveness.With
the availability of this additional income safety
net,producers may decide nottopurchase crop
insurance if (in their view) the risk mitigation
effect of this commodity program is sufficient
for their purpose.
7 The introduction of this new
revenue program may run counter to past
government initiatives that increased premium
subsidies to encourage noninsured producers
to participate in the crop insurance program
and for producers already insured to buy at
higher coverage levels.
In addition, this new commodity program
may directly affect crop insurance program
efficiency because of its similarity with a
current area-based revenue product called
Group Revenue Income Protection (GRIP).
The concept behind GRIP is the same as the
proposed revenue commodity program except
that GRIP is at the county level and it is not
free (i.e., insurance premiums has to be paid).
The proposed revenue-payment scheme in the
farm bill seems to be duplicative of GRIP and
one has to ask the question whether the
introduction of the revenue payment program
is a good use of taxpayer money when there is
an area-based revenue crop insurance program
already in place. Is it cost-effective for the
governmenttooffertworevenueprogramsthat
seemtomitigatethesametypesofrisks?Hence,
the introduction of the revenue-based com-
modity program has the potential to adversely
affect the crop insurance program from a
standpoint of program participation and cost-
effectiveness (i.e., duplicative coverage).
TheStandardReinsuranceAgreement(SRA)
and insurance company reimbursements. A
unique aspect of the federal crop insurance
program is the role of private insurance
companiesinprogramdeliveryandrisksharing.
The relationship between the U.S. government
and these private insurance companies is
governed by the Standard Reinsurance Agree-
ment (SRA). The last SRA agreement was
negotiated in 2005 and, at the moment, the
government (through the Federal Crop Insur-
anceCorporation[FCIC])lackstheauthorityto
do further renegotiations. In both the House
and Senate versions of the farm bill, there are
provisions to allow the FCIC to conduct more
periodic renegotiations of the SRA to ensure
thatthecropinsurancemarketsarereflectiveof
current conditions.
Aside from the periodic renegotiation of
the SRA, both the House and Senate versions
of the proposed farm bill have language that
reduces the Administrative and Operating
Expenses (A&O) reimbursement rate given to
crop insurance companies. In accordance with
the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act and
through the SRA, A&O reimbursements are
given to crop insurance companies to cover
the costs of delivering crop insurance to
producers (i.e., payment of agent commis-
sions, loss adjustment, etc.). The A&O reim-
bursement acts like a sales commission—for
each dollar of premium the company brings in
they retain a certain percentage.
For the 2006 crop year, the average
reimbursement was 20.7% of net premiums
(Gould).Thispercentagehassteadilydecreased
over time (for example, in 2000, the rate was
25.7%). Nevertheless, with net premiums of
$4.6 billion in 2006, the companies received
approximately $958 million in A&O reim-
bursements. In 2000, the companies only
received $642 million in A&O reimbursements
(based on approximately $2.5 billion in net
premiums that year). With this high level of
reimbursements in recent years, the House and
Senate versions of the proposed farm bill have
provisions that decrease the A&O reimburse-
ment rates of crop insurance companies. The
7This assumes that there is no legislation that
makes receipt of commodity program and/or disaster
assistance payments conditional on participation in
the crop insurance program.
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decrease, while the Senate version suggests a
2.0 percentage point reduction.
The farm bill provisions that allow for
periodic renegotiation of the SRA and reduc-
tion in A&O reimbursements may have
implications for the efficiency of the crop
insurance program (especially in the delivery
aspect of the program). As some of the
companies have argued, these proposed pro-
visions may hinder the effective delivery of
crop insurance to the nation’s farmers due to
the higher cost burden that they have to bear.
With some producers already raising the issue
about slow loss adjustment process (see Smith,
Dismukes, and Novak), theproposedSRA and
reimbursement rate provisions in the farm bill
may further exacerbate this problem (i.e., the
higher cost burden to the companies may force
them to reduce the number of adjusters and
agents that service farmers). But note that it is
not entirely clear whether the reductions will in
fact significantly hinder the crop insurance
companies’ ability to effectively service the crop
insurance needs of U.S. producers.
Development of new crop insurance policies.
Under the current farm bill legislation, devel-
opers of new crop insurance policies bear all
the research and development costs associated
with the new policy. In the House and Senate
versions of the proposed farm bill there are
provisions that allow the FCIC to share some
of the costs and the associated financial risks
of developing a new crop insurance product.
However, this proposed language in the bill
again raises the issue of whether development
of new policies is a cost-effective priority given
the number of existing products, as well as the
proposed revenue commodity program in the
bill. There is already an initiative to consoli-
date and streamline the crop insurance pro-
gram by combining some of the existing
products into a ‘‘combo’’ policy to reduce
transaction costs of servicing different policies.
Development of new and complex policies
would seem to go against the gains from
consolidating existing products. Would the
funds for sharing the financial risk of devel-
oping new products be better served for
research initiatives to improve the actuarial
and underwriting performance of current
products or the proposed combo policy?
Increased funding to combat fraud, waste,
and abuse. Since the 2000 Agricultural and
Risk Protection Act (ARPA of 2000), there
has been an increased emphasis on deterring
fraud, waste, and abuse in the crop insurance
program through the use of information
technology and ‘‘data mining’’ techniques.
The idea is to strengthen the compliance
function of the program by developing com-
puter algorithms to look through the millions
of crop insurance records and reveal patterns
that indicate potential fraud, waste, and
abuse. In the House and Senate versions of
the proposed farm bill, there is language to
increase the level of support for data mining
activities aimed at uncovering patterns in the
crop insurance records that are indicative of
fraud, waste, and abuse. There have been
several reports that have provided cost-saving
figures to show the effectiveness of the
program (i.e., dollars of illegal indemnities
prevented and collected back). However, there
is still uncertainty in the crop insurance
industry about whether or not the increased
funding for data mining activities is indeed a
worthwhile initiative (Smith, Dismukes, and
Novak). Furthermore, the amount of fraud
and/or abuse deterrence due to this increased
compliance function is hard to quantify and
may not be truly known. Hence, there are
questions whether the benefits from the
increased funding for data mining would be
more than the costs.
Summary of farm bill insurance issues. Crop
insurance and risk management issues have
always been part of the debates that accom-
pany the development of farm bill legislation.
The 2007 Farm Bill is no exception. Revenue-
based commodity programs, the SRA, insur-
ance company reimbursement rates, financial
risk sharing with crop insurance policy devel-
opers, and funding to strengthen fraud detec-
tion are major issues in the House and Senate
versions of the proposed farm bill that would
potentially impact the functioning of the crop
insurance program in the next few years. The
potential interrelationships of these new pro-
visions with the current commodity programs,
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gram will shape how farmers manage their risk
and will eventually impact how the agricul-
tural economy will evolve over the years.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Data
Our analysis is conducted using individual
farm data collected under the Agricultural
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) proj-
ect by the National Agricultural Statistics
Service of the USDA. The ARMS data are
collected at the end of each calendar year by
means of a survey of individual farmers. The
ARMS data represent the USDA’s primary
source of information about U.S. agricultural
production conditions, marketing practices,
resource use, and economic well-being of farm
households. We focus on data taken from the
period between 2002 and 2005. These years
were characterized by a common policy
environment—the 2002 Farm Bill. Although
the ARMS data provide a rich and valuable
set of detailed farm household data, the
database does have an important limita-
tion—the lack of repeated sampling on
individual farms. That is, the sample is taken
randomly each year and it is thus impossible
to observe the same farm in more than a single
year. This implies an important reliance on
cross-sectional variability and prevents one
from conditioning observed events on the
preceding year’s experience or on fixed farm
effects. In addition, identification issues may
be complicated by an inability to condition on
variables that are clearly predetermined (i.e.,
observed in previous time periods). As we
discuss in detail below, we pursue a recursive
identification structure that is supported by
the sequence of production decisions, payment
receipts, and realized net farm returns.
A variety of other sources were used to
collect pertinent data. We collected annual,
county-level measures of direct government
payments from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Informa-
tion System (REIS). Farm program payment
data were collected for each county in thestudy
area from unpublished Farm Service Agency
(FSA) sources for the period covering 1998–
2005. We grouped all disaster payments
together into a single category. Our intent is
to capture payment expectations—which
should be the primary factor influencing
producer decisions. In that realized farm
program payments vary substantially from
year to year and receipts in any single year
may not be representative of the expected value
of payments. This is especially true for ad hoc
types of payments, such as disaster relief. We
thus take the average of overall government
payments and disaster payments over the 4-
year period preceding each year of interest and
use farm acreage for the county reported in the
2002 Agricultural Census to place the payments
on a per-acre basis. So, for example, expected
government payments for county i in year t
would be given by the average of payments for
the county over years t21 ,...,t24. County-
level crop insurance statistics were taken from
the Risk Management Agency’s (RMA) sum-
mary of business database. We also used the
preceding 4-year average value of the ratio of
total indemnities to farmer-paid premiums and
the ratio of insured to total farm acres in each
county. Current-year values of disaster pay-
ments and crop insurance premium rates were
also included in the empirical models, as we
discuss below.
An important characteristic of the ARMS
data relates to the stratified nature of the
sampling used to collect the data. The
statistical agency that directs the collection
and analysis of the ARMS data—the National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)—rec-
ommends a jackknife procedure where the
estimation data are split into a fixed number
of subsamples and the estimation is repeated
with each subsample omitted. However, this
approach may not be entirely appropriate
when analysis focuses on a subset of the
sample, as is the case in our analysis. The
ARMS data contains a population weighting
factor, representing the number of farms in the
population (i.e., all U.S. farms) represented by
each individual observation. We used this
weighting factor to weight each observation
in the likelihood function used in estimation.
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equations. The first represents the crop
insurance participation decision. We define a
discrete variable, d1it that takes the value one if
farmer i purchased crop insurance in year t
and is zero otherwise.
8 A second discrete
variable d2it is one if farmer received disaster
payments and zero otherwise. Finally, we
define a measure of realized farm profitability.
Specifically, we define a rate of return in terms
of gross farm income and total expenses as:





Note that the rate of return is a continuous
variable and can assume positive and negative
values.
Our intent is to focus on commercial crop
farms. Thus, we delete any farm that had less
than 100 harvested crop acres in the year of
the survey. Any farm that reported zero gross
income or zero total expenses was also
dropped from the analysis. Likewise, any farm
that reported no sales of crop or livestock
commodities was dropped from the analysis.
In the end, we were left with 1,921 observa-
tions over the 4 years under consideration.
Econometric Specification and Methods
The discrete dependent variables d1it and d2it
are assumed to represent continuous, normally
distributed latent variables representing the
propensity to purchase crop insurance and to
receive disaster payments. We assume that the
continuous variable y3it is also normally
distributed. A specific recursive structure
underlies our econometric model. This struc-
ture is suggested by the timing of insurance
purchase decisions, receipt of disaster relief,
and reported gross sales and expenses at year’s
end. It is often the case that eligibility for ad
hoc disaster relief requires participation in the
federal crop insurance program. Insurance
purchase decisions are made at planting time
while disaster payments would be expected to
follow the harvest.
9 Gross farm income and
expenses are reported at the end of the
calendar year and thus would be preceded by
any reported crop insurance expenditures and
disaster payment receipts. In light of these
timing issues, we expect that the insurance
purchase decision is exogenous to all other
dependent variables but that disaster pay-
ments may be endogenous to insurance
purchases. Likewise, we assume that disaster
payment receipts by an individual farmer will
be predetermined relative to year-end farming
returns and crop insurance purchase decisions.
Thus, we allow farming returns to be endog-
enous to both crop insurance participation
and disaster payments.
10 Our joint estimation
approach allows for endogeneity of the right-
hand-side binary dependent variables and
permits explicit testing of the endogeneity
through a consideration of the correlation of
disturbance terms across equations.
This assumed recursive structure suggests
the following structural model:
ð2Þ
d1it ~ d1X1it z u1it ~ b
1Z1it z u1it
d2it ~ d2X2it z u2it ~ b2Z2it z c2itd1it z u2it
y3it ~ d3X3it z u3it ~ b3Z3it z c3itd1it
z c3itd2it z u3it:
8Crop insurance purchases are indicated if positive
expenditures for crop or hail insurance is reported in
the survey.
9Note that timing considerations and the calendar-
year nature of the ARMS survey may complicate the
matching of insurance purchases, planting decisions,
and disaster payments across crop years. In particular,
winter crops are typically planted in the preceding
calendar year and disaster payments may arrive with a
substantial delay. Despite these complications, it is
clear that the reported insurance purchases will likely
precede disaster payment receipts during the calendar
year and that realized calendar year-end farming
returns will follow crop insurance expenditures and
disaster payment receipts.
10Note that, to the extent that an individual
farmer’s receipt of disaster relief and realized farming
returns are influenced by unobserved variables affect-
ing both variables, endogeneity issues may remain.
However, in light of the fact that disaster relief is
usually determined by Congress on the basis of the
hardships experienced by a large group or region, one
can argue that disaster payments are endogenous to
the returns of any single farmer. Such endogeneity and
identification issues remain an important topic of
current research.
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exogenous variables Zkit to contain at least one
variable that is unique to that equation.
11
The three-equation system suggests a tri-






























This, in turn, suggests a trivariate distribution
describing the discrete and continuous out-
comes for farmer i in year t of
ð4Þ
fd 1it, d2it, y3it ðÞ








w2 d1it, d2itjy3it, S ðÞ dd1itdd2it,
where w2(N) is a bivariate probit density function
and S is the covariance matrix defined in
Equation (3).
12 Monfardini and Radice discuss
exogeneity testing in recursive bivariate probit
models of the form applied here. Endogeneity
of the binary right-hand-side variables is
implied if the correlation coefficients for
residual terms across equations are statistically
different from zero. Monfardini and Radice
discuss a range of tests to evaluate simultaneity
of the explanatory discrete variables.
Estimation of joint models containing
more than two endogenous variables can be
complicated by the numerical complexity
associated with the joint likelihood function.
We utilize the numerical simulation methods
of Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane (GHK)
to estimate the joint model.
13 The GHK
method simulates truncated normal distribu-
tions and then conditions on the simulated
values in simulations of other truncated
normal distributions, thereby using products
of conditional densities to simulate joint
densities. The method makes use of the fact
that normal random variables, when condi-
tioned on other normal variables, remain
normally distributed. Geweke, Keane, and
Runkle present Monte Carlo evidence dem-
onstrating that the GHK method works very
well for estimating multivariate probit models.
Results
Table 1 defines the empirical variables of
interest and presents summary statistics for
our sample. The means and standard deviations
were calculated using the ARMS population
weights. The statistics indicate that 28.8% of the
individual farms received disaster payments in
the year of the survey. A large proportion of the
farms—82.1%—purchased some form of crop
insurance in the year of the survey. The average
rate of return, defined as the logarithm of the
ratio of gross income to total cash expenses, was
38%.
14 The average farm was over 1,880 acres in
size and had 789 harvested crop acres. Over the
preceding 4-year period, the average farm was in
a county that had received over $29 per farm
acre in government payments and over $3 per
farm acre in disaster payments. About 32% of
total farm acres (which includes noncrop acres)
were insured under the federal crop insurance
program. Wheat was the predominant crop,
followed by corn and soybeans. Cotton was
produced in localized areas in the study region,
particularly in Texas and Oklahoma.
Table 2 presents simulated maximum like-
lihood estimates of the recursive system of
11Other restrictions can also be used to ensure
identification. In particular, restrictions on the covari-
ance matrix of the residual terms can be used to
achieve identification.
12See Regan and Catalano for a discussion of the
derivation and estimation of multivariate models
containing mixtures of discrete and continuous
variables. A similar recursive, bivariate probit model
was developed and estimated by Buchmueller, et al.
13For a discussion of simulation methods of
estimation and the GHK algorithm, see Geweke,
Keane, and Runkle; Hajivassiliou; Keane; and
McFadden.
14Note that this figure is based on calendar-year
cash expenses only and thus does not include
amortized expenses for fixed inputs and other noncash
expenses. Thus, the high rate of return corresponds to
returns to such fixed assets. Many other measures of
farm profitability are conceivable.
424 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008equations. The first equation in the system
represents the demand for crop insurance,
which is expressed in discrete terms (partici-
pation or no participation). A number of
existing studies have examined factors associ-
ated with the demand for crop insurance,
including Goodwin and Smith and Goodwin.
The coefficients generally are of the correct
sign and correspond to the direction of the
effect of changes in the explanatory variables
on the probability of insuring.
15 Farms located
in counties that have realized significant
participation in the crop insurance program
over the preceding 4 years are much more
likely to insure. This is as expected and may
reflect a number of county-level factors
associated with insurance participation, in-
cluding average losses, premium rates, and the
marketing efforts of insurance agents. Farms
in counties that have realized substantially
higher total government payments are more
likely to buy insurance. However, an impor-
tant result is that farms in counties that have
realized high disaster payments over the
preceding 4 years are significantly less likely
to buy insurance. This result suggests that the
constant provision of ad hoc disaster relief
serves as a disincentive for farmers to buy
insurance. Farmers in counties that have
realized larger returns to crop insurance, as
represented by the ratio of indemnities to
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
a
Variable Definition Mean SD
Disaster 1 if farm received disaster payments, 0 otherwise 0.2880 4.0631
Insured 1 if farm bought insurance, 0 otherwise 0.8213 3.4372
Return to farming Log of the ratio of gross farm income to total farm
expenses (times 100)
35.3326 442.6555










Average disaster payments per farm acre (preceding
4 years)
3.0623 27.4803
Farm size Total farm size (hundred acres) 1.8869 23.6640
Harvested acres Harvested acreage for all crops (hundred acres) 0.7887 8.0157
Diversification 1 Herfindahl index of diversification 0.3164 2.3624
Corn Proportion of harvested acreage planted to corn 0.1726 2.4474
Cotton Proportion of harvested acreage planted to cotton 0.0680 2.1487
Wheat Proportion of harvested acreage planted to wheat 0.4728 3.5565
Soybeans Proportion of harvested acreage planted to soybeans 0.1315 1.9559
Sorghum Proportion of harvested acreage planted to grain sorghum 0.0786 1.6166
Loss-Ratio Average ratio of indemnities to farmer-paid premium
(preceding 4 years)
2.8644 14.1626
Premium rate Crop insurance premium rate 0.1327 0.4628
Off-farm work Proportion of household income from off-farm sources 0.4212 65.7843
Tenure Ratio of rented to total acreage 0.4829 3.1816
Leverage Ratio of debts to assets 0.2078 7.3325
Livestock Ratio of livestock sales to total farm sales 0.2781 3.0148
Disaster payments Current year county average disaster payments ($/farm acre) 2.3238 22.1173
a Number of observations is 1,921. Summary statistics weighted by ARMS population sampling weights.
15Marginal effects in a probit model are given by
the product of the standard normal density and the
coefficient. Many versions of the marginal effects are
possible, depending on the observations at which the
density is evaluated. A good approximation involves a
consideration of the value of the standard normal
density that corresponds to the proportion of obser-
vations for which the binary variable is one. In our
case, these values are approximately 0.25 and 0.34 for
the insurance and disaster equations, respectively.
Goodwin and Rejesus: Safety Nets or Trampolines? 425farmer-paid premium (i.e., premiums net of
subsidies), are significantly more likely to
purchase insurance. However, farmers in
counties with higher overall average premium
rates are less likely to insure. This is in
accordance with existing research on the
demand for insurance, which has shown that
higher premiums will lower the demand for
insurance. Larger crop farms, as represented
by the number of harvest acres, are more likely
to insure. This result is also consistent with
existing research, which has argued that fixed
costs to insurance and the marketing efforts of
agents tend to favor larger farms.
Diversification of crop enterprises, which
is represented by one minus a Herfindahl
index of diversification, are more likely to
insure. Although diversification is typically
assumed to lower risk exposure, this effect
may be offset by efficiency gains that occur
with specialization. Production agriculture
has become more specialized and of increas-
ing scale and thus highly diversified opera-
tions may face more production risk and
have a greater demand for insurance. The
results reflect significant differences in the
level of participation in crop insurance across
different crops. Farms with a significant
share of acreage devoted to cotton produc-
tion are the most likely to insure. Corn- and
wheat-producing farms are the next most
likely to insure, while farms devoting a large
share of acreage to soybeans are the least
likely to insure. Farms that have a larger
share of their total farm sales coming from
livestock products are more likely to pur-
chase crop insurance. Again, this may reflect
higher risks that are associated with diversi-
fication across crop and livestock enterpris-
es. Farm households that derive a significant
share of their total income from off-farm
sources are less likely to buy insurance. This
accords with the results of Mishra and
Goodwin, who found that off-farm work
was an important measure used to manage
farming risks. In this way, off-farm work
may be a valid substitute for purchases of
crop insurance.
Table 2 also contains parameter estimates
of a probit model of disaster payment receipts.
Table 2. Empirical Estimates and Summary




Probit Model of Insurance Decision
Intercept 20.2224 0.0229 29.71*
County acres insured 1.9259 0.0365 52.79*
County government
payments 0.0029 0.0005 5.29*
Loss-Ratio 0.0468 0.0011 41.44*
Premium rate 24.0583 0.0869 246.71*
County disaster
payments 20.0645 0.0030 221.52*
Harvested acres 0.3580 0.0048 74.86*
Diversification 1.0618 0.0206 51.45*
Corn 0.6011 0.0218 27.53*
Cotton 2.2991 0.0444 51.74*
Wheat 0.5390 0.0176 30.61*
Soybeans 20.1777 0.0257 26.92*
Livestock 0.0976 0.0126 7.75*
Off-farm work 20.0114 0.0019 26.15*
Leverage 0.1903 0.0209 9.11*
Probit Model of Receipt of Disaster Payments
Intercept 22.0496 0.02002102.64*
Insured 1.4633 0.0208 70.48*
Disaster payments 0.1286 0.0014 93.34*
County government
payments 20.0076 0.0003 226.31*
Harvested acres 0.0174 0.0045 3.88*
Corn 20.4351 0.0197 222.12*
Cotton 21.4737 0.0466 231.59*
Wheat 20.0047 0.0164 20.29
Soybeans 0.2700 0.0231 11.67*
Livestock 0.8557 0.0126 67.69*
Continuous Regression Model of Farm Returns
Intercept 24.6838 0.6933 26.76*
County government
payments 20.1389 0.0124 211.23*
Disaster 3.2026 0.9404 3.41*
Insured 42.6544 0.9281 45.96*
Harvested acres 22.4812 0.2063 212.03*
Diversification 21.9397 0.6770 22.87*
Corn 213.7561 0.6856 220.06*
Cotton 39.4559 0.9704 40.66*
Wheat 8.2612 0.6240 13.24*
Soybeans 5.4280 0.8630 6.29*
Off-farm work 20.1145 0.0090 212.7*
Tenure 13.2715 0.3720 35.68*
s 49.5657 0.0877 565.39*
rInsured/Income 20.4444 0.0090 249.62*
rDisaster/Income 0.1051 0.0122 8.64*
rInsured/Disaster 20.4821 0.0139 234.69*
* Indicates statistical significance at the a 5 .10 or smaller
level.
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models—crop insurance participation has a
significant positive relationship with disaster
payment receipts. This may reflect require-
ments that were introduced when the manda-
tory provisions of the 1994 Crop Insurance
Reform Act were lifted.
16 Current period
disaster payment receipts at the county level
are included in the probit model to reflect the
idiosyncratic weather shocks that would be
expected to underlie aggregate provision of
disaster payments. As expected, farms in
counties that receive more payments in a
given year are more likely to receive disaster
payments. In contrast, farms in counties
receiving a large share of government pay-
ments are less likely to receive disaster
payments. This suggests that disaster pay-
ments are a substitute for other forms of
government support. This may also reflect the
negative correlation between aggregate yields
and price. When yields losses are widespread,
prices will be higher and thus government
support that is tied to the market (i.e.,
deficiency payments) will be lower. However,
it is in such periods that ad hoc disaster relief
will be more likely. Larger farms are more
likely to receive disaster payments. Cotton
growers appear less likely to receive ad hoc
disaster assistance while soybean growers and
farms with a significant share of livestock sales
appear more likely to receive disaster assis-
tance. This may reflect the fact that a
substantial share of ad hoc disaster assistance
is targeted toward livestock growers who have
suffered feed and grazing losses.
Table 2 also presents parameter estimates
for a conventional regression model of our
measure of gross farm returns to total cash
production costs. An interesting result is that
farms in counties with more government
payments appear to realize lower returns to
their cash costs. However, farms that receive
disaster payments appear to have significantly
higher rates of return to farming. Likewise,
farmers that purchase crop insurance appear
to have higher returns over their cash produc-
tion costs. This may suggest that crop
insurance plays an important role in the
management of farm risks in that farmers
that purchase crop insurance appear to be
more profitable. The result for disaster pay-
ments and crop insurance may also suggest the
‘‘trampoline’’ effect implied by the title of this
paper. Disaster payments and insurance may
raise farm incomes.
Larger crop farms appear to be less
profitable. This may reflect the ‘‘inverse
productivity puzzle’’ often observed in agri-
culture (see, for example, Assuncao and
Ghatak). Diversification also appears to lower
farm profitability. This is consistent with the
results for crop insurance participation in that
more diversified farms were more likely to
insure, perhaps reflecting greater production
risk. Tenure status appears to be significantly
correlated with profitability, with farmers
that own a higher share of their operated
acreage appearing to be more profitable.
Cotton farms appear to be the most profit-
able, followed by wheat and soybean farms.
Corn farms in this region appear to be the
least profitable. As would be expected, off-
farm work appears to lower the profitability
of farming. This is in agreement with the
results of Goodwin and Mishra who found
that farmers who tended to work more off the
farm were less efficient.
Finally, Table 2 presents correlation coef-
ficients for the residual terms across the three
equations. In each case, the correlations
appear to be statistically significant, suggest-
ing endogeneity of insurance participation in
the disaster payments equation and endogene-
ity of both insurance participation and disas-
ter payment receipts in the farm profitability
equation.
Summary and Conclusions
The objectives of this paper were two-
fold. First, we intended to review the im-
16For a single year—1995—farmers were required
to purchase crop insurance in order to be eligible for
any farm program benefits. Congress quickly lifted
this unpopular requirement but made eligibility for
disaster payments dependent upon the purchase of
crop insurance.
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risk management dimensions of U.S. ag-
riculture and policy. Our efforts in this
regard were hampered in that agreement
on the specific terms of a farm bill does not
exist as of the writing of this paper. How-
ever, we do know the specific terms of
the competing versions of the bill passed
by the House and Senate. Both versions
of the legislation suggest the possibility of
some rather significant changes in risk man-
agement policy. In particular, optional reve-
nue insurance plans based on state or national
farm revenues are proposed. We review the
details of these policies as well as other
changes contained in the proposed legislation
that may impact the federal crop insurance
program.
We also pursue an empirical analysis of the
interrelationships of crop insurance, disaster
relief, and farm profitability. Several impor-
tant results arise from this analysis. First,
farmers in counties that tend to continually
receive a significant level of ad hoc disaster
payments are less likely to buy insurance. This
is consistent with the conventional wisdom
that the continual provision of ad hoc disaster
support serves to reduce incentives to buy
insurance. Other aspects of the demand for
crop insurance are confirmed in our analysis,
including the negative effect of higher premi-
um rates and the positive inducement to
insure brought about by higher returns to
insurance.
Our analysis also suggests that farmers
that buy insurance and that receive disaster
payments tend to have higher returns to
farming. This may suggest that farmers that
insure and are in areas with greater disaster
assistance are better farm managers. Alter-
natively, this may suggest that crop insur-
ance and disaster relief payments represent
wealth transfers that tend to increase farm
incomes.
Our results are preliminary and tentative.
Hopefully, the final terms of the new farm
bill will become clear in the early part of 2008
and thus will provide a fruitful arena for
discussion in the session that includes this
paper.
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